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Abstract
In a canonical model of borrowing and lending, an exclusion technology that fea-
tures full exclusion for a deterministic number of periods following default maximizes
stationary equilibrium welfare. This exclusion policy maximizes the stationary volume
of mutually beneficial lending transactions. It also maximizes the average welfare of the
excluded. The optimal length of exclusion depends on fundamentals such as borrower
patience and the direct cost of default. It also depends on incentives to default for
strategic rather than exogenous reasons.
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1 Introduction
A large literature studies the role of the threat of exclusion from financial markets in models
with endogenous default. Somewhat surprisingly, most papers in this literature take the spec-
ification of the exclusion policy as given.1 For example, in their seminal work on endogenous
incompleteness, Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2001, 2008) assume for the most part that exclusion
from credit markets is permanent, even though they recognize that other policies could raise
welfare.2 Chatterjee et al. (2006) quantify the effects of various bankruptcy designs in a
model where exclusion ends with a positive probability every period. Tertilt et al. (2007)
and Liu and Skrzypacz (2013) assume that agents are excluded for a deterministic number
of periods. Elul and Gottardi (2015) show that partial exclusion – whereby defaulting agents
are only excluded with a certain probability – is generally welfare improving in a model with
moral hazard and endogenous borrower reputation.3
In this paper, we fully characterize the optimal shape of exclusion policies in a canonical
model of lending with endogenous and exogenous default. A benevolent social planner who
can design exclusion policies however she wishes chooses to exclude defaulting agents for a
deterministic number of periods. While our social planner generally finds it optimal to inflict
some punishment via exclusion in order to discourage strategic default, she also designs the
exclusion policy so that excluded agents are allowed back into markets as fast as possible.4
This “harsh but short” punishment approach has two distinct advantages. First, front-
1Two exceptions are Bond and Krishnamurthy (2004) and Corbae et al. (2016). Bond and Krishnamurthy
(2004) model exclusion as direct constraints on transfers from lenders to investors and study the optimal
shape of those constraints. However, in the context of our model without savings or endowment, their policy
would imply permanent exclusion. Corbae et al. (2016) propose a model where exclusion from credit markets
arise endogenously as borrowers rebuild their reputation following default. They use their model to quantify
the value of having a good reputation in competitive credit markets.
2In section 7, they show by example that exclusion lotteries can raise welfare. Alvarez and Jerman (2000)
implement the resulting equilibrium allocations in an environment with portfolio constraints and study the
asset pricing properties of the resulting model.
3Gu, et al. (2013a,b) use probabilistic exclusion and show that it can generate interesting dynamics.
Bethune et al. (2017) argue that partial exclusion may be optimal due to a pecuniary externality in an
environment where more trade in a particular period tightens borrowing constraints in earlier periods. Zhu
(2013) also finds that finite exclusion may be optimal in the dynamic moral hazard model of DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2006). In the context of supporting noncooperative collusion with private information, Green and
Porter (1984) show that short periods of non-cooperative plays are necessary to maintain cooperation.
4The corporate finance literature also shows that optimal financial contracts limit punishment or exclu-
sion. For example, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) show that lenders discipline borrowers by excluding them
probabilistically from future loans. We add to this literature by showing that it is optimal to bring back
excluded borrowers as fast as possible.
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loading punishment makes the mass of active investors hence the mass of socially valuable
transactions as high as it can be. Second and much less intuitively, this policy maximizes the
average welfare of excluded agents in stationary equilibrium. Because of those two comple-
mentary virtues, complete but finite exclusion is optimal no matter how the planner chooses
to weigh the welfare of the excluded. Remarkably, maximizing the welfare of the excluded
also maximizes the number of mutually beneficial transactions in stationary equilibrium.
Full but temporary exclusion following default, which we find to be optimal, is a good
approximation of how default is punished in practice. In most industrialized nations, one
of the primary consequences of credit default by individuals, firms, and sovereigns alike is
the temporary exclusion from credit markets. On the domestic side, most countries have
regulations that allow credit bureaus to record failure-to-pay events and sell that information
to creditors. Empirical research has shown that the ability of consumers to borrow is severely
impaired by bad records. Bad records, that is, do lead to the effective exclusion of potential
borrowers from credit markets. Exclusion, however, is temporary both in practice and as a
result of legal constraints, for all defaulting agents, be they individuals, firms, or sovereigns.
As documented for instance by Elul and Gottardi (2015), most nations impose a statute of
limitation that caps the length of credit records. Sovereigns, likewise, experience exclusion
following default but are typically able to return to credit markets after a few years.
In the extant literature, making punishment for default as harsh as feasible often raises
welfare. Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2001, 2008) describe a dynamic general equilibrium model
where the threat of exclusion from credit markets is necessary to support lending along the
equilibrium path. In their model, the harsher the exclusion policy, or the higher the con-
sequences of exclusion, the more contracts can typically be supported in equilibrium.5 In a
similar vein, Kocherlakota (1996) considers a dynamic risk-sharing game between two agents
with risky endowments. He shows that a feasible allocation in his model can be supported
as a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if at every history each agent receives at least
the utility they expect in autarky. One interpretation of this result is that subgame perfect
arrangements are supported by the threat of permanent exclusion. In his environment, this
maximal threat makes the set of sustainable contracts as large as it can be, hence is optimal.
Our model does not have this property: extreme punishments are usually suboptimal. Like
borrowers do in practice, our agents default in some cases because they have no choice, while
5Krueger and Perry (2005) use this key property to argue that increases in income inequality can lead to
less consumption inequality since the penalty associated with exclusion is higher in environments with high
income uncertainty.
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others choose to default even though they could pay what they owe. This maps neatly into
what applied economists typically classify as strategic and non-strategic defaults. Default
rates, therefore, are bounded below. This means that exclusion has to be finite in length
almost surely for there to be positive trade in any stationary equilibrium. Even when infinite
exclusion is feasible, a social planner chooses to forgive defaulters in finite time. In fact,
as we mentioned above, our benevolent planner chooses to design an exclusion policy that
minimizes the expected duration of exclusion – instead of maximizing it – conditional on the
level of punishment needed to deter strategic default.6
Our result resembles standard findings in the classical analysis of repeated game with
discounting. Abreu (1988) shows that discounted games can be completely analyzed using
“simple” strategy profiles which specify a path of preferred actions and punishments for any
deviation from that path. Like in our model, punishment is independent of history and,
optimally, decreases in harshness through time. In that setting, lowering the severity of
punishment is necessary for subgame perfection: “early stages of an optimal punishment
must be more unpleasant than the remainder [...] to deter a player from cheating when he
is already being punished as harshly as possible.” In our case, a planner has the ability to
commit to any punishment profile she wishes and chooses to front-load punishment because
any early forgiveness must be compensated for disproportionately in the future. Another key
difference is that we consider a planner who must rely on markets in the spirit of Kehoe and
Levine (1993) hence internalize the effect of her policy choices on contract terms.
Having fully characterized the optimal shape of the exclusion technology, we go on to
show that the optimal length of exclusion depends on the model’s fundamentals. Intuitively,
the opportunity cost of exclusion depends on the profitability of investment projects, while
the direct cost of exclusion depends for instance on agents’ patience. We show that a higher
average propensity to default for strategic reasons is associated with a higher optimal length
of defaults. This makes intuitive sense since exclusion only serves to deter strategic default.
Importantly, this does not imply that the frequency of strategic default – an empirical
6Elul and Gottardi (2015) find that forgiveness can be optimal in a model of borrower reputation. In our
model, eventual forgiveness with probability one must be optimal, for otherwise all agents would asymptot-
ically find themselves excluded. This aspect of our model is similar in spirit to a point made by Dubey et.
al (2005) and Quintin (2013) about the optimal intensity of direct default punishment. In both papers, the
set of contracts borrowers and lenders can write is exogenously restricted and, as a result, default is a part of
equilibrium outcomes. In those environments, punishing default more harshly can lower welfare. It can even
lead to higher default rates and, like in our environment, typically leads to fewer transactions. Our paper
focuses on exclusion threats and forgiveness rather than direct punishment, but it does share the feature that
maximizing the punishment via exclusion would lead to eliminating all lending.
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object about which there is an intense debate7 – is a good guide for choosing the optimal
length of default. As has been pointed out in related contexts by Dubey et al. (2005) and
Quintin (2013), there is no predicable relationship between the harshness of punishment and
the frequency of strategic default. What we show is that the optimal shape of the exclusion
technology can be characterized fully.
2 The environment
Consider an economy in which time is discrete and infinite. There is one good that cannot
be stored across periods. The economy contains a mass one of infinitely-lived investors.
Investors are each endowed with a project but no good. They can activate their project in
each period by investing one unit of the good at the start of a period. When it is successful,
with probability π > 0, a project pays output y > 0 at the end of the period and nothing
otherwise. A law of large numbers holds so that π is also the fraction of projects that deliver
positive output in a given period.8
To simplify the exposition, we will first assume that investors are risk-neutral and discount
future payoffs at a constant period rate of β ∈ (0, 1). However, linearity plays no role in any of
our results. We relax it fully in section 6. There we consider an environment with risk-averse
investors and traditional risk-sharing contracts. While this makes notation and derivations
more burdensome, our results are unchanged.
Each period t ∈ {0, 1, . . .} a large mass of lenders are born endowed with a unit of the
unique good. Lenders consume at the end of the period and then die. They can store the
endowment they receive at the start of the period for a time-invariant safe payoff R ∈ (0, y).
They can also lend their endowment to an investor (or, equivalently, to a collection of lenders)
in exchange for a promised payment mt ∈ [0, y] to be delivered if the project is successful at
the end of date t. We will assume that lenders behave competitively in the sense that they
take mt as given.9 The fact that lenders live only for one period implies that all contracts
7See e.g. Foote et al. (2008) and Gerardi et al. (2015).
8In Bond and Krishnamurthy (2004), lenders find it optimal to exclude defaulting borrowers from future
loans as long as they have not been reimbursed. In our context this essentially means permanent exclusion
because investors must borrow in order to produce.
9While they could offer a contract with a higher payment no investor would take it. As is well known (see
Quintin, 2012) incentives could exist in a model with endogenous default such as ours to offer a contract with
a lower required payment but a lower probability of default. Below we will only consider equilibrium that
make that option unprofitable for lenders. More simply, one can also apply the equilibrium concept of Dubey
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must be one-period risky debt contracts which simplifies the analysis.10
Only investors observe their output realization. Furthermore, commitment on their part is
limited. If they abstain from making a payment they experience a penalty τ drawn at the end
of the period from a known distribution F . The default cost τ captures any remorse or shame
defaulting investors experience as well as the effects of punishments other than exclusion.
One can also think of $ Absent any exclusion threats, investors of type τ ≥ 0 repay their loan
when and only when their project is successful and
mt ≤ τ.
Our environment captures in a simple way the two types of default events that correspond
to the classification used in applied work.11 Strategic default occurs when the project is
successful but, nonetheless, investors choose to experience disutility τ rather than honor their
debt. Non-strategic default occurs when the project fails and investors have no choice but to
default. This clean dichotomy will enable us to obtain sharp comparative statics in section 5.
Only investors know why they failed to pay so that other agents cannot distinguish defaults
types from one another. The fact that ex-post default costs can be non-degenerate allows for
equilibrium in which a strictly interior fraction of agents default for strategic reasons.12
From the point of view of lenders, expected returns on loans to investors equal storage
returns when:
π(1− F (mt))mt = R. (2.1)
Indeed, only the mass 1−F (mt) of successful investors whose τ is below mt repay. As Quintin
(2012, 2013) discusses at length there are potentially many solutions to this equation because
of the endogeneity of default. To avoid the associated complications, assume for concreteness
that when there are several interior solutions to (2.1), the lowest one prevails. This is the
solution that makes investors as well off as possible in the set of payments lenders are willing
to accept.13
et al. (2005) and assume away the issues raised by Quintin (2012, 2013) on anonymity grounds.
10We conjecture that our main results will not change much once that assumption is relaxed because all
our arguments are developed conditional on agents being in default.
11See e.g. Foote et al. (2008.)
12We could assume that agents who default for exogenous reasons also experience disutility cost τ ≥ 0 or,
for that matter, a different cost from strategic defaulters, without any effect on any part of the upcoming
analysis.
13When F is continuous equation (2.1) does not display jumps so that if an m exists such that π(1 −
F (m))m > R then a solution exists by the intermediate value theorem. When F is not continuous, jumps
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Since we have yet to introduce an exclusion technology there are no meaningful dynamics
in this environment and all equilibria are stationary given the selection rule we specified above.
In fact, this version of our economy is essentially a special case of the two-date model Dubey et
al. (2005) describe in which all default punishment is a direct and exogenous utility penalty.
Not surprisingly then, existence holds in our model in as much generality as it does in theirs.
Specifically, if no strictly positive solution to (2.1) exists lenders store their endowments and
no project is activated. If, on the other hand, the set of solution to (2.1) is not empty, a
stationary equilibrium simply is the lowest value m in that set together with the associated
repayment policies. One of these two types of equilibrium must exist.
3 Economies with exogenous exclusion technologies
Assume now that an exclusion technology is available. Formally, an exclusion technology is
a sequence {φs}+∞s=0 of forgiveness probabilities. When an agent fails to pay in a particular
period, he is precluded from participating in lending markets – that is, he is kicked off from
the economy – with probability 1−φ0 while with the complementary probability he is treated
like any other agent. After this first draw, agents who have been excluded for n periods are
allowed to return to the economy with probability φn.
We assume that forgiveness draws are independent across time so that, for instance, the
probability that an agent is going to be excluded for exactly n periods is
φn+1
n∏
s=0
(1− φs).
By the same logic,
+∞∏
s=0
(1− φs)
is the probability that excluded agents will never be allowed to return to the loan market.
This general formulation encompasses all the specifications employed in the existing litera-
ture on endogenous default. Immediate forgiveness (φ0 = 1) yields the economy we described
in the previous section, a special case of the environment described by Dubey et al. (2005).
At the opposite extreme, zero forgiveness (φs = 0 ∀s) – i.e. permanent exclusion – is the case
can be filled up by allocating different borrowers to different ends of each jump so that, once again, a break
even payment can be found if and only if π(1− F (m))m > R for some m > 0.
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studied in Kehoe and Levine (1993). Chatterjee et al. (2006) specify constant forgiveness
rates, i.e. φs = φ ∀s. The one-time forgiveness lottery of Elul and Gottardi (2014) corresponds
to the case where φ0 > 0 but φs = 0 for all s > 0. Setting φs ∈ {0, 1} for all s gives exclusion
for a deterministic number of periods as in Tertilt et al. (2007) or Liu and Skrzypacz (2013).
Our formulation also allows in principle for much more complex forgiveness policies.14
Given the possibility of exclusion, investors can now be in different states at the start of
a given period. Some agents are in default i.e. excluded, the rest have no default on their
records and are allowed to participate in markets. Among excluded agents, we also need
to record the number of periods for which they have been excluded since, in general, the
forgiveness probability may depend on that length of time.
Throughout this paper we will focus on stationary equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which
contract terms m and the mass of agents of each type are constant. In any such equilibrium,
let V N be the expected lifetime utility of investors who are not in default while V E(n) is
the same for agents who have been excluded for n periods. Then, given the time-invariant
payment m expected from investors,
V N = (1− π)βV E(0) + πEτ max
{
y −m+ βV N , y − τ + βV E(0)
}
(3.1)
Clearly then, investors choose to pay once they discover their default cost τ if
m ≤ τ + β
[
V N − V E(0)
]
(3.2)
so that the lender’s break-even condition becomes
π
(
1− F
(
m− β
[
V N − V E(0)
]))
m = R. (3.3)
To complete the description of the environment we only need to define V E(n) for all n:
V E(n) = φnV
N + (1− φn)βV E(n+ 1). (3.4)
Standard arguments show that, givenm, equation (3.1) and equation (3.4) define a contraction
14We are making the implicit assumption that non-excluded investors are all treated equally once they
default. This is without loss of generality as long as the stigma shock is independent across periods. But if
types are persistent, welfare may be improved by making punishment depend on the credit history of investors.
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mapping in V N . This means that V N is uniquely defined so that, in turn and by (3.1), V E(n)
is uniquely defined for all n.
Several intuitively obvious features of these value functions will help the upcoming analysis.
First, computing V N only requires knowing V E(0) and m. In fact and by the same logic, given
V E(0) there exists a lowest solution m to condition (3.2) which, among all solutions, makes
the welfare of investors highest. Third, given V E(0), the optimal default policy hence the
stationary rate of default can be computed. In the next section, these facts will enable us
to split the search for the optimal exclusion policy into two natural steps. Finally, condition
(3.4) implies that V E(n) ≤ V N for all n so that, holding V E(0) the same, welfare is highest
when the mass of excluded agent is lowest.
To build a stationary equilibrium, start from m small enough that the left-hand side of
equation (3.3) is below R (start from m = 0, say.) Then increase m until that left-hand
side is R. If no m ≤ y meets that condition, the only stationary equilibrium is the no-trade
equilibrium. In the other case, let 1 > δD ≥ 1− π be the time invariant fraction of investors
who default on their loan in a given period.
Let µN be the mass of investors who enter a period as non-excluded. In a stationary
equilibrium, that object must satisfy:
µN = µN(1− δD) +
+∞∑
n=0
µE(n)φn (3.5)
where µE(0) is the mass of investors who defaulted in the previous period hence just entered
exclusion while, for n > 0,
µE(n) = µE(n− 1)(1− φn−1).
The following result tells us which exclusion technologies can support stationary equilibria
with positive investment.
Lemma 3.1. A stationary equilibrium with µN > 0 exists only if
+∞∑
n=0
Πns=0(1− φn) < +∞. (3.6)
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Proof. Assume that
∑+∞
n=0 Π
n
s=0(1− φn) = +∞ but that µN > 0. For all n,
µE(n) ≥ µE(0)Πns=0(1− φn).
But
µE(0) ≥ µNδD
since the mass of newly excluded investors includes those who where not excluded at the
start of the previous period and defaulted. (As we will discuss in the next section, µE(0) also
includes borrowers who were forgiven in the previous period and defaulted immediately, but
we do not need to count them precisely in the context of this proof.) It follows from these
inequalities that:
+∞∑
n=0
µE(n) ≥ µNδD
+∞∑
n=0
Πns=0(1− φn) = +∞.
But in any stationary equilibrium we need
µN +
+∞∑
n=0
µE(n) = 1.
The result follows.
To understand this result, assume for instance that
Π+∞n=0(1− φn) > 0,
among other ways in which we may have
+∞∑
n=0
Πns=0(1− φn) = +∞.
Then a strictly positive fraction of investors who are excluded never return to markets. This
implies that the only steady state of the Markov chain defined by the transition functions
above puts all mass on the exclusion state. Hence, the only exclusion technologies that are
compatible with strictly positive investment in equilibrium are the ones for which excluded
investors eventually return to markets. Together with the condition we derived in the previous
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section, that restriction also becomes sufficient to sustain positive investment in steady state.
Proposition 3.2. A stationary equilibrium with strictly positive investment exists if and only
if:
1.
∑+∞
n=0 Π
n
s=0(1− φn) < +∞,
2. A solution m ≤ y exists to equation (3.3).
In summary, given an exclusion technology so that excluded investors return to markets
with probability one, an equilibrium only requires that a payment size be such that the
expected return on loans equals the return on storage.
4 Optimal exclusion
Consider a benevolent planner who can select the exclusion technology before trade takes
place. Above we showed that a stationary equilibrium exists for any given exclusion technol-
ogy. Furthermore, as long as
+∞∑
n=0
Πns=0(1− φn) < +∞,
a stationary equilibrium with strictly positive investment may exist. When there are multi-
ple m that satisfy equation (3.3), the corresponding equilibria can be welfare ranked. The
equilibrium with the lowest m maximizes V N and V E(n) for all n. Since we take the point
of view of a benevolent planner in this section, we assume that she has the ability to select
the stationary equilibrium with the lowest m given the exclusion technology.
We will first consider a planner who weighs all investor types equally although many of the
claims we make below generalize to cases where the planner values types differently, as we will
discuss later. Assume then that the planner chooses an exclusion technology to maximize:
µNV N +
+∞∑
s=0
µE(s)V E(s) (4.1)
where, recall, µN is the mass of active investors in stationary equilibrium whereas, for all s,
µE(s) is the mass of investors who have been in default for s periods. Equivalently, the social
planner is maximizing the stationary equilibrium welfare of investors who will be randomly
assigned to one of the countable types of investors.
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The weights in the objective function sum up to one since the population of investors is
one. Given this observation we can rewrite the objective function as
V N +
+∞∑
s=0
µE(s)[V E(s)− V N ].
This is intuitive: the welfare loss associated with excluding investors is V E(s)− V N for each
excluded type s.
This problem can be separated into natural blocks which allows us to solve this problem in
several tractable steps. First, we study the optimal way to deliver a particular initial default
value V E(0). Conditioning on V E(0) pins down the optimal m and V N , by equations (3.1)
and (3.3). The planner’s goal now becomes:
max
{φs}+∞s=0
∑+∞
s=0 µ
E(s)[V E(s)− V N ]
subject to
V E(0) = φ0V
N + (1− φ0)φ1βV N + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)φ2β2V N + . . . (4.2)
To understand the constraint, recall that excluded investors do not have any endowment and
do not trade so that they only enjoy positive utility once they return to the non-excluded
fold. The objective function in the above problem can be rewritten as:
µE(0)
{[
V E(0)− V N
]
+ (1− φ0)
[
V E(1)− V N
]
+ (1− φ0)(1− φ1)
[
V E(2)− V N
]
+ . . .
}
since for all s > 0 we have
µE(s) = µE(0)
s−1∏
i=0
(1− φi).
To proceed consider the maximization problem that remains after dropping µE(0). In
other words, consider the problem of maximizing the average welfare of excluded investors in
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stationary equilibrium. Using expression (3.4), the resulting objective is
P = −(1− φ0)
[
V N − βV E(1)
]
− (1− φ0)(1− φ1)
[
V N − βV E(2)
]
− . . .
= −V N [(1− φ0) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2) + . . .]
+ (1− φ0)βV E(1) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)βV E(2) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)βV E(3) + . . .
In the appendix we show that the final part of the expression for P (the last line in the string
of equations above) is constant over the constraint set defined by (4.2), as long as
+∞∑
n=0
Πns=0(1− φn) < +∞.
While the detailed argument for why this is true is quite involved, the intuition is simple. The
final part of the expression is proportional to the utility defaulting agents expect following
default, a level which is pinned down by the constraint. Given this fact, it follows that
maximizing P over the constraint set amounts to minimizing
ζ ≡ (1− φ0) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2) + . . .
subject to the constraint that the right level of punishment must be imposed.
We show in the appendix that this is done by making early φ’s zero until the constraint
(4.2) is met. In other words, maximizing the average welfare of excluded investors given that
punishment (4.2) must be inflicted on investors who just defaulted is optimally done by fully
excluding them until they have suffered precisely the punishment equilibrium requires. Then
investors return to the non-excluded fold with probability one.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The planner could even out forgiveness chances
across excluded investors of each type. For instance, she could select the unique constant φ
that meets the punishment constraint. This would give defaulting agents a chance to avoid
exclusion altogether, for one potential benefit. But when the planner does so, she needs to
increase punishment (reduce forgiveness odds) in the future. Because of time-discounting (β <
1) the increase in future punishment more than undoes the benefits of reducing the severity
of punishment in early periods. This intuition is formalized in the variational argument
developed in the appendix.
The bottom line is that maximizing the average welfare of the excluded is the same as
13
minimizing ζ. But ζ admits a convenient interpretation for our purposes: it is monotonically
related to the mass of excluded investors in any period. Indeed, recall that µE(0) is the mass
of agents that just became excluded at the start of a given period. In turn,
µE(1) = (1− φ0)µE(0),
while
µE(2) = (1− φ0)(1− φ1)µE(0)
and so on and so forth. It follows that the total mass of excluded may be written as
+∞∑
s=0
µE(s) = µE(0)(1 + ζ).
In words, minimizing ζ corresponds to minimizing the mass of investors who are excluded in
any period. To proceed, the following expression for µE(0) will be useful.
Lemma 4.1. In any stationary equilibrium with positive investment,
µE(0) = µN × δ
D
1− δD
where δD is the time-invariant default rate on loans.
Proof. In any stationary equilibrium,
µE(0) =
[
µN +
+∞∑
n=0
µE(n)φn
]
δD. (4.3)
To understand this expression for µE(0), note that there are two ways to enter default from
one period to the next. First, non-excluded agents may default. Second, excluded agent can
be forgiven at the start of the previous period but then default immediately. But
+∞∑
n=0
µE(n)φn = µ
E(0) [φ0 + (1− φ0)φ1 + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)φ2 + . . .] = µE(0), (4.4)
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where we have used the fact that the bracketed expression adds to one if and only if
+∞∑
n=0
Πns=0(1− φn) < +∞.
This should once again be intuitive. The mass of agents who exit exclusion must equal the
mass of agents who enter exclusion in any stationary equilibrium. Combining expressions
(4.4) and (4.3) gives the lemma.
Since the sum of all types is one, we need
µN + µE(0)(1 + ζ) = 1
or, given the lemma we just established,
µN + µN(1 + ζ)
δD
1− δD
= 1⇐⇒ µN = 1
1 + δ
D
1−δD (1 + ζ)
.
In particular and quite remarkably, maximizing the average welfare of the excluded – i.e.
minimizing ζ – also maximizes the mass of active investors and hence the volume of transac-
tions in stationary equilibrium. Unambiguously then and regardless of how the social planner
wishes to weigh the welfare of the excluded versus that of the included, a policy of full but
finite exclusion maximizes stationary equilibrium welfare. The following proposition – our
main result – collects these results.
Proposition 4.2. In any stationary equilibrium that maximizes average welfare, the forgive-
ness policy {φs}+∞s=0 must be such that for some s∗,
1. φs = 0 for all s < s∗;
2. φs∗ ∈ (0, 1];
3. φs∗+1 = 1 and φs ∈ [0, 1] for all s > s∗ + 1.
In summary, bringing excluded investors back into markets as fast as possible given that
a certain level of punishment needs to be imposed in equilibrium is optimal because doing so
has two distinct virtues. First, it maximizes the stationary mass of active investors. Second
and much less intuitively, it also maximizes the average welfare of excluded investors. The
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second feature stems from the fact that if the planner chooses to be lenient early and releases
some of the excluded investors it must reestablish incentives by increasing punishment on
investors that have been excluded for longer. Discounting implies that this punishment more
than offsets the gains of the investors released from exclusion.
Note that the optimal exclusion policy involves a non-degenerate forgiveness lottery in at
most one period. Obviously, in the natural continuous time limit of our environment, the
optimal policy would not require this randomization device. An equivalent interpretation
of φs∗ ∈ (0, 1] is that investors are only allowed to operate their technology for part of
transition period s∗. In particular, no randomization device is necessary to implement the
optimal exclusion policy.
5 Exclusion length
Having now fully characterized the shape of the socially optimal exclusion policy, we can
discuss the one remaining defining feature of the optimal policy: the duration of exclusion.
Obviously, the need for punishment hence the length of exclusion depends on every funda-
mental characteristic of the environment. To make this clear, we will consider a particular
version of our economy where the optimal exclusion length can be solved for analytically and
where sharp comparative statics can be obtained. We will then explain why, in general, the
relationship between optimal exclusion length, fundamental parameters and the equilibrium
quantity of default must be ambiguous.
5.1 Homogenous default cost
Consider a version of our economy where the distribution F of default costs only puts mass
at one point τ . If τ ≥ y then no agent ever chooses to default and the optimal exclusion
length is zero. Indeed, exclusion only serves to deter strategic default. In fact, if τ ≥ R
π
then
lenders can set m = R
π
, which exposes them once again to zero strategic default and enables
them to break even. In that case, once again, the optimal length of exclusion is zero.
When τ < R
π
, on the other hand, the case we will study for the remainder of this section,
agents do have static incentives to default for strategic reasons. Absent some exclusion threat,
they would all default which cannot be in equilibrium. This yields a key simplification in the
construction of equilibrium. Because investors are homogenous ex-ante, the optimal solution
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has to be such that all investors pay as long as they can. As a result, the optimal exclusion
policy must be the one that makes payment among investors with successful projects just
optimal.
To make this precise, given an exclusion technology, define κ ≡ V
E(0)
V N
as the fraction of
active investor utility V N borrowers give up when they choose to default. Given and only given
the facts we have established about the shape of exclusion in this paper, κ is monotonically
related to (= a sufficient statistic for) exclusion length. A lower κ means longer exclusion.
We will refer to κ ∈ [0, 1] as the exclusion discount. Borrowers pay when
m ≤ (1− κ)βV N + τ. (5.1)
It is clearly optimal for the planner to design an exclusion policy that makes this inequality
tight. Otherwise she would be giving up on valuable trades by excluding investors for longer
than is strictly needed. Furthermore, it is not just incentive compatible but also socially
optimal for investors to pay since this makes µN = 1. The break-even condition for lenders
becomes:
πm = π((1− κ)βV N + τ) = R, (5.2)
and we can solve for V N as follows:
V N = π
(
y −m+ βV N
)
+ (1− π)βκV N
since, in this case, investors only default for non-strategic reasons.
This equation together with the facts that
m = (1− κ)βV N + τ = R
π
enables us to solve out for V N and obtain a condition which the exclusion discount κ must
solve in any equilibrium:
R− πτ
πβ(1− κ)
= πy −R + R− πτ
(1− κ)
+
(1− π)κ(R− πτ)
π(1− κ)
.
A bit of algebra then yields a closed-form expression for the optimal exclusion policy:
κ =
π2(y − τ)− 1
β
(R− τπ)
π2(y − τ)− (R− τπ)
(5.3)
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The following proposition collects and summarizes the consequences of these results:
Proposition 5.1. When default costs are homogenous at given value τ , the optimal exclusion
discount solves
κ = max
(
π2(y − τ)− 1
β
(R− τπ) , 0
)
.
In particular, exclusion length falls with investor patience (β), project size (y), project
quality (π), and with the direct punishment (τ) associated with default.
An increase of patience increases the cost of exclusion and enables the planner to shorten
its length. An increase in project payoff (y) makes exclusion more costly since the benefit from
investing are higher. Raising π, likewise, makes the value of participation higher. While, at
the same time, it does lead to more opportunities to default for strategic reasons, the positive
effect on the value of participation dominates.
Probably most interesting is the relationship between incentives to default for strategic
defaults and exclusion length. When the project succeeds, the cost of defaulting is two-fold:
exclusion and direct punishment τ. When τ is higher, exclusion becomes less useful and the
planner can shorten it which leads to a higher volume of transactions. On a basic level, the
fact that the propensity to default for strategic reasons matters for optimal exclusion length
is not surprising. After all, the only point of exclusion is to discourage strategic default.
This homogeneous version of our environment has the stark feature that no strategic
default takes place in equilibrium. This is no longer the case when F is non-degenerate, a
case to which we now turn.
5.2 Heterogenous default costs
Assume that ex-post default costs can either be low at τL = τ − ε or high at τH = τ + ε where
ε > 0 and, for concreteness, we assume that these two outcomes are equally likely. This
amounts to imposing a mean-preserving spread on the version of F we used in the previous
subsection. The planner can choose to set the exclusion length to dissuade both ex-post types
from defaulting from strategic reasons. Instead, she could dissuade just the high-default cost
borrower, or, finally, she could choose to dissuade neither borrower type.
In other words, there are three possibilities. First, the planner can choose to set κ to solve
(5.3) for τ = τH in which case only low-default cost borrowers default for strategic reasons.
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Low-default cost agent are then excluded for the corresponding time but since they cannot
be dissuaded from strategic default, it makes no sense to exclude them any longer than what
is strictly necessary to keep high-cost agents in line. If this option turns out to be optimal,
note that imposing a mean-preserving spread on F results in lowering the length of exclusion.
Second, the planner can choose to set κ to solve (5.3) for τ = τL so that no agent ever
defaults for strategic reasons. In that case, the mean-preserving spread results in lengthening
the duration of exclusion. Third and finally, the planner can simply give up on dissuading
any agent from strategic default by setting κ = 0.
It is easy to select parameters so that any of those three results of spreading F may
solve the social planner’s problem. This means that, in general, mean-preserving spreads on
incentives to default for strategic reasons have ambiguous effects on optimal exclusion length.
We can describe this ambiguity more precisely.
Proposition 5.2. Starting from an economy with homogenous default costs in which optimal
exclusion length is positive, a mean-preserving spread in default costs raises exclusion length
for ε small enough but must eventually drives exclusion length to zero as ε becomes large
Proof. Start from the homogenous economy and introduce an infinitesimal spread τH − τL =
ε>0. Adjusting κ by setting τ = τL in (5.3) has no first order effect on any policy. Not
adjusting, however, would cause half of agents with successful projects to begin defaulting for
strategic reasons. Therefore adjusting by raising exclusion length infinitesimally is optimal.
Once τH − τL becomes large, high-default cost agents need not be dissuaded any longer
while low default cost agents cannot be dissuaded by exclusion as τL becomes low and then
eventually negative (these agents get positive utility from defaulting.) The social planner now
has no choice but to give up on the low-cost agents.15 This completes the proof.
Local mean-preserving spreads in default costs cause exclusion length to increase because
the social planner finds it optimal to keep low-default cost borrowers from defaulting for
strategic reasons. But as the spread in F becomes large, exclusion threats become less potent.
High default-cost agents do not default anyway while very low-default cost agents simply
cannot be dissuaded from doing so.
15As the preceding discussion explained, before reaching zero there may be a point where the planner chooses
to only dissuade high-cost agents. Once that stage is reached, a bigger spread starts lowering exclusion length.
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6 Extensions
This section briefly considers five variations on our basic environment. The first three – risk-
aversion, exogenous punishment while excluded, and exogenous exit – have no effect on our
key results about the shape of the optimal exclusion policy. The final two do change the
nature of optimal exclusion in significant ways.
6.1 Risk-aversion
Much of the literature on endogenous default – Corbae et al. (2005) and Kehoe and Levine
(1993), for two prominent examples – focuses on the relationship between exclusion threats
and the endogenous level of risk-sharing. This subsection considers a version of our environ-
ment with a risk-sharing motive and shows that the optimal shape of the exclusion policy is
unchanged.
Assume that investors have time separable preferences with the same discount rate as
before but a Von Neumann-Morgenstern period utility function U that is strictly concave with
|U(0)| < +∞. Further assume that the default cost τ is measured in consumption equivalent
units. Since lenders are risk-neutral, investors and lenders now have an incentive to share
risk. To allow for that possibility, write mH ∈ [0, y] for the payment from the investor to
lender when the project succeeds while mL ≥ 0 is a payment from the lender to the investors
when the project fails.16 As has been the case throughout this paper, we continue to focus on
stationary equilibria. Investors now pay when the project is successful and given their default
cost τ if
U(y −mH) + βV N ≥ U(y +mL − τ) + βV E(0)
where
V N = (1−π)
(
U(mL) + βV
N(0)
)
+πEτ max
{
U(y −mH) + βV N , U(y +mL − τ) + βV E(0)
}
,
while
V E(0) = φ0V
N + (1− φ0)
[
U(0) + φ1βV
N
]
+ (1− φ0)(1− φ1)
[
βU(0) + φ2β
2V N
]
+ . . .
16We could restrict contracts to those that stipulate mL = 0 so that lenders do not provide any insurance
at all to investors. Our point in this section is that the class of exclusion policy we have described in this
paper is optimal regardless of whether or not risk-sharing happens in stationary equilibrium.
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The expression for V E(0) is exactly the same as before except that it is potentially shifted
up or down when U(0) 6= 0. As a result, it should be clear that the optimal shape of the
exclusion policy cannot change. For one thing, a normalization of U(0) to zero is without loss
of generality as long as |U(0)| < +∞, which brings us back to the exact same expression as
in the linear case.
A few more lines of algebra will clarify these facts and enable us to generalize our results
to broader interpretations of U(0) in the next subsection. Write
V E(0) =
U(0)
1− β
+ φ0Ṽ
N + (1− φ0)φ1βṼ N + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)φ2β2Ṽ N + . . .
where
Ṽ N = V N − U(0)
1− β
.
A similar expression obtains for V E(n) for all n > 0. In other words, introducing general
preferences results in level shift of exclusion continuation utility functions – which cannot
have any effect on welfare rankings of exclusion policy function - and a parallel shift of the
gains from forgiveness given V N . It follows that the same exclusion policy as in the linear case
continues to maximize the average welfare of the excluded. The fact that this also maximizes
the volume of transactions follows from the same arguments as before.
Algebraic considerations aside, the argument is unchanged because of the fundamental
separation result this paper has established and built on. Once a equilibrium level V E(0) is
set, it is optimal to administer the associated punishment as fast as possible, both because
this makes the numbers of transactions as high as possible and because it maximizes the
welfare of the excluded.
6.2 Exogenous punishment while excluded
Assume that the social planner is able to impose exogenous punishment17 on excluded in-
vestors which amounts to making the period utility excluded investors enjoy below U(0).
Again, doing so amounts to shifting V E(0) up or down which cannot change the optimal
shape of the exclusion policy. To see this, replace U(0) with some arbitrary, finite but possi-
17One practical and important form of punishment borrowers may experience while excluded from financial
markets is wage garnishment. While comparatively rare in practice in the United States, garnishment is
frequent and strictly enforced in most European economies. Livshits et al. (2007) study the quantitative
importance of garnishment.
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bly negative punishment utility UP . The algebra we presented in the previous subsection is
unaffected, and we once again reach the conclusion that the optimal shape of the exclusion
policy is unaffected.
A more complex problem results from assuming that UP can change over time. With
enough freedom to select the level of exogenous punishment, one can justify exclusion policies
that differ drastically from the punish-as-fast-as-possible solution. For instance, it becomes
possible to threaten defaulters with very large punishment with low probability in the future.
Positive levels of early forgiveness may then become optimal, compensated by a non-zero
probability of reaching a distant but high exogenous punishment period.
6.3 Exogenous exit
Assume that that an exogenous fraction χ of excluded investors exogenously return to the
non-excluded set of agents. This is equivalent to assuming that a fixed fraction of agents die
each period and are replaced by an offspring whose welfare they value exactly as they do their
own, with, in particular, the same discount rate. Given exogenous exit from exclusion, the
forgiveness policy must feature φn ≥ χ for all n which directly implies that condition (3.6)
holds. The exact same argument as in the unconstrained case implies that φn ≥ χ is binding
until the desired level of punishment has been reached.
In other words, the substance of our result – that punishment should be front-loaded as
much as feasible – does not change when exogenous exit is introduced. The case where exiting
agents do not value the welfare of their replacement like their own is more tedious to deal
with because this introduces a wedge between the social planner’s valuation of exit and that
of investors. But it remains the case that, optimally, punishment via exclusion should be
front-loaded.
6.4 Observable income
Consider a version of our model in which project outcomes are public information. This allows
the social planner to recognize whether default occurred by choice or by constraint. She can
now condition exclusion length on default types. A first, obvious consequence of this change
is that the social planner will immediately forgive all exogenous default. Indeed, that type of
default cannot be helped and excluding those agents would result in needlessly lowering the
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volume of lending contracts in stationary equilibrium.18
On the other hand, the social planner will usually choose to exclude agents who default for
strategic reasons, especially since she can now do so without wasting the associated incentives
on borrowers who do not need them. If a level of exclusion exists that completely eliminates
strategic default, imposing that level is obviously optimal. At the other extreme, it is possible
(see subsection 5.2 for specific examples) that strategic default cannot be dissuaded in which
case exclusion is once again socially wasteful. In general however, our model clearly predicts
that when conditioning is feasible, borrowers who can document extant exogenous shocks
should be excluded for a shorter period.
6.5 Non-stationary policies
Assume that our planner, instead of maximizing long-term stationary equilibrium welfare,
maximizes the average welfare of the current investors, with type arbitrarily distributed at
date 0. Assume that they have the ability to commit to an entire future path of exclusion
policies. That is, they have the ability to announce and commit to forgiveness probabilities
for every excluded type at every future date.
One immediate consequence of this change in objective is that a stationary solution is no
longer optimal. First and most obviously, the planner will always choose to forgive all the
excluded investors at date 0 since punishing them has no impact on incentives while forgiving
them makes the volume of transactions as high as it can be at date 0. After date 0 however, the
incentives we have discussed throughout this paper are active and the planner will generally
find it optimal to commit to some exclusion following default in the future.
If the planner does not have the ability to commit, by the same logic, the set of feasi-
ble/sustainable exclusion policies shrinks even more drastically. Indeed, forgiving currently
excluded agents becomes optimal at every history. Although making this point formally
requires solving an intricate repeated game, a natural conjecture is that the only subgame
perfect outcome in the resulting environment is full forgiveness in every period which brings
us back to the environment we described in section 2 where only direct, exogenous punishment
18This feature of our environment has a practical counterpart in the fact that the underwriting process for
new mortgages often inquires about and documents causes for recent blemishes. Loan officers and mortgage
underwriters are more likely to extend new loans to impaired borrowers when they can establish that exogenous
circumstances caused the credit difficulties on record, provided that those exogenous circumstances have been
resolved, as is the case by assumption in our model. Persistent credit impairment shocks do tend to be
associated with lengthy exclusion and this would happen de facto in our model as well.
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can sustain lending.
7 Conclusion
In a canonical model of borrowing and lending with endogenous default, we find that an
exclusion technology that features full exclusion for a finite number of periods maximizes sta-
tionary equilibrium welfare. Not only does this shape for the exclusion technology maximize
the volume of transactions, it also maximizes the welfare of the excluded, conditional on the
fact that some punishment generally needs to be imposed to sustain positive lending.
While we find that this result is robust to a host of considerations, we have abstracted
from two important complications. As in Kehoe and Levine (1993) or Bulow and Rogoff
(1989), our agents do not accumulate assets over time. This means that we do not need to
keep track of an endogenous distribution of wealth as a state variable. A tractable extension
with durable assets along the lines of Lagos and Wright (2005) would not change our result
since the wealth distribution is degenerate in that case. Dealing with non-degenerate wealth
distributions in more general environments is a promising if complex avenue for future work.
Likewise, we have focused on stationary equilibrium and exclusion policies. In so doing,
not only do we reduce the dimension of our problem to a manageable size, we also sidestep
the time-consistency issues that would arise if we allowed for the possibility of one-time
amnesties, among other non-stationary options. Implicitly then we have focused on a social
planner that has the ability to commit and cares about long-term welfare. To us, this seems
a natural guiding principle for setting up the legal institutions that frame lending. Studying
the consequences of limited commitment on the part of policy makers should also lead to
interesting insights.
8 Appendix
8.1 Simplification of expression P
We need to show that
(1− φ0)V E(1) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)V E(2) + ...
is constant given constraint 4.2. To see it, write the expression as follows:
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(1− φ0)φ1V N +(1− φ0)(1− φ1)φ2βV N +(1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)φ3β2V N + ...
(1− φ0)(1− φ1)φ2V N +(1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)φ3βV N +(1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)(1− φ3)φ4β2V N + ...
(1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)φ3V N +(1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)(1− φ3)φ4βV N +(1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)(1− φ3)(1− φ4)φ5β2V N
+....
Now sum the whole infinite expression column by column. The coefficients in the first column
sum up to
(1− φ0)− Π+∞n=0(1− φn).
In order to support some investment in equilibrium, the planner has to restrict herself to
exclusion policies such that the second term is zero.19 As a result, the first column gives
(1−φ0)V N . For the second column sum all weights and apply the same argument as above to
get (1− φ0)(1− φ1). For the third column the sum of all weights is (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2).
So summing it all we get:
(1− φ0)V N + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)βV N + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)β2V N + ....
Now note that each term has a 1 − φ0 factor so that it can each be split into two pieces to
get:
V N+(1−φ0)βV N+(1−φ0)(1−φ1)β2V N+...−φ0V N−(1−φ0)φ1βV N−(1−φ0)(1−φ1)φ2β2V N−...
The second part of the expression, given the constraint, is simply V E(0). The first part, other
than for the very first term, yet again features a common factor (1− φ0) which can be used
to split it into two subparts, leaving us with:
V N − V E(0) + βV N + (1− φ0)β2V N + ...
−β
{
φ0V
N − (1− φ0)φ1βV N − (1− φ0)(1− φ1)φ2β2V N − ...
}
19In fact, not only is Π+∞n=0(1 − φn) = 0 but, with the convention that if φn = 1 then φs = 1 for all s = 1,
then Π+∞n=s(1 − φn) = 0 for all s ≥ 0. This means that the reasoning we apply to the first column applies
similarly to all other columns. The convention can be imposed without any loss of generality since φn = 1
caps exclusion at n periods with probability one.
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By the constraint, the final line in this expression is nothing but βV E(0). Continuing in this
fashion shows that the whole sum is
V N − V E(0) + β
[
V N − V E(0)
]
+ β2
[
V N − V E(0)
]
=
V N − V E(0)
1− β
which is a constant given V N and V E(0), as claimed.
8.2 Full but finite exclusion maximizes P
Given the previous result, maximizing P amounts to minimizing
(1− φ0) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2) + . . .
subject to the restriction that condition 4.2 must hold i.e. that V E(0) is what it needs to
be to support the stationary equilibrium. Traditional variational arguments show that this is
done by adopting the policy described in proposition 4.2.
To see this, assume first that φ2 = 1 so that excluded investors are sure to return to
markets after two periods of exclusion. In that case, the problem boils down to
min(1− φ0) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)
subject to:
φ0 + (1− φ0)φ1β + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)β2 =
V E(0)
V N
.
Now add and subtract (1− φ0)(1− φ1)β to the left-hand side of the constraint to get:
φ0 + (1− φ0)β − (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(β − β2) =
V E(0)
V N
.
The proposition holds if φ0 > 0 =⇒ φ1 = 1. Assume by way of contradiction that φ0 > 0 but
φ1 < 1. Then it is possible to reduce φ0 by some ε > 0. This causes the first two terms of the
constraint to fall by a total of ε(1 − β). Maintaining the constraint level thus requires that
(1− φ0)(1− φ1) falls by
ε(1− β)
β − β2
=
ε
β
.
But then (1−φ0) rises by ε while (1−φ0)(1−φ1) falls by εβ , which improves (i.e. lowers) the
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objective strictly, the contradiction we sought.
Assume now that φ3 = 1. The objective becomes
min(1− φ0) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)
subject to:
φ0 + (1− φ0)φ1β + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)φ2β2 + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2)β3 =
V E(0)
V N
.
Rewrite the constraint as
φ1 + (1− φ1)φ2β + (1− φ1)(1− φ2)β2 =
V E(0)
V N
− φ0
β(1− φ0)
.
This makes it clear that holding φo constant the problem in φ1 and φ2 is exactly the same as
before. This implies as before that if φ1 > 0 then φ2 = 1. But then in that case we are back
once again to the problem above which implies that if φ0 > 0 then φ1 = 1. If on the other
hand φ1 = 0 then the constraint reads as
φ0 + (1− φ0)φ2β2 + (1− φ0)(1− φ2)β3 =
V E(0)
V N
.
But we can then invoke the same argument as above (add and subtract (1− φ0)(1− φ2)β2 to
the left-hand side of the constraint and proceed) to conclude that if φ0>0 and φ1 = 0 then
φ2 = 1 is optimal. But we already know that if φ2 = 1 then φ0>0 and φ1 = 0 cannot be
optimal.
All told then and proceeding recursively, the solution has to be such that if φs > 0 for
some s then φs+1 = 1, as long as φ is eventually 1. Under that premise, minimizing
(1− φ0) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1) + (1− φ0)(1− φ1)(1− φ2) + . . .
is done by selecting the unique policy {φ∗t}
T
t=0 that satisfies the conditions of proposition 4.2
and meets the punishment constraint exactly.
To complete the proof then, we only need to argue that the premise that φ is eventually 1
is without loss of generality. Denote by
{
φ̄t
}T
t=0
a policy that minimizes the above objective
without imposing that restriction. That policy must be such that φ̄t > 0 for at least one t.
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So there must be a first non-zero term. Without loss of generality, assume φ̄0 > 0. (The
argument below can be shifted forward if φ̄0 is the first non-zero term is further along the φ
sequence.)
Fix ε > 0. Pick T high enough so that
+∞∑
s=T
βsV N <
ε
k
where k is a positive constant to be specified below. This cutoff has the property that the
expected value (
φ̄0 + (1− φ̄0)φ1β + (1− φ̄0)(1− φ̄1)φ̄2β2 + . . .
)
V N
accounted for by
{
φ̄t
}T−1
t=0
has to be within ε
k
of V E(0). Now consider the alternative policy{
φ̂t
}T
t=0
which coincides with
{
φ̄t
}T
t=0
up to T − 1 but is identically one thereafter. That
policy lowers the objective vis-a-vis
{
φ̄t
}T
t=0
but may exceed V E(0) by at most ε. This can
be rectified by lowering φ̂0 = φ̄0 > 0 by an amount less than ε as long as k is selected to be
large enough. The resulting policy gives an objective value within ε of
{
φ̄t
}T
t=0
and this is
true, a fortiori, of {φ∗t}
T
t=0. Since {φ∗t}
T
t=0 is ε-optimal for all ε, it achieves the same minimum
as
{
φ̄t
}T
t=0
, and is therefore optimal. This completes the proof.
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